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EVIDENCE ON RISK CHANGES AROUND AUDIT
QUALIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION
WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENTS
Neil L. Fargher and Michael S. Wilkins*

INTRODUCTION

The Auditing Standards Board eliminated the `subject-to' qualification with
SAS No. 58 (AICPA, 1988a). Elimination of the `subject-to' report implied
that the Auditing Standards Board believed the opinion conveyed no material
information to users or at least had no significant economic value. At the time
the opinion was repealed a press report indicated that:
Many analysts lament that a major warning signal has been obscured. The auditors
have lowered the red flag and want us to believe that it is still aloft.1 (Wall Street
Journal, May 17, 1989).

Although several studies have examined the information content of these opinions, the analysts' views in particular suggest that additional investigation is
warranted.
An auditor's opinion on financial statements is an important responsibility
of the accounting profession. In forming an opinion, the auditor must locate
and assess the existence of material uncertainties which the auditor believes
must be drawn to the attention of financial statement users. Kinney and Smith
(1992) state that:
modified audit reports may show due diligence by the auditor, and may be the basis
for the auditor's claim that the user was properly warned about a departure from
GAAP or an unusual risk.

If modifications and qualifications to financial statements accurately identify
material uncertainties that affect firm risk, then we would expect to observe
shifts in risk when qualifications are disclosed. The purpose of this paper is to
determine whether such shifts occur.2
Our tests are structured to determine whether partitioning based upon the
public announcement of a qualified audit opinion is a sufficient basis for iden* The authors are respectively from Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, and
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tifying shifts in risk.3 Most previous studies (e.g., Dodd, et al., 1984; Dopuch,
et al., 1986; and Fields and Wilkins, 1991) use price revisions to proxy for the
information inferred by the market at the time of the announcement. Price
revisions, however, can be a function of revisions both in expected future cash
flows and in the expected risk of future cash flows. Given that the nature of an
audit qualification relates to the underlying risk of the firm, we believe that
tests involving changes in risk provide a valuable alternative measure of the
information that is conveyed by audit reports.
Our initial empirical tests do not detect a significant increase in systematic
risk around announcements of qualified audit opinions. These tests, however,
may be biased against finding such shifts given that public announcements are
often pre-empted by other forms of disclosure. When we focus on announcements that are more timely ^ specifically, announcements of qualification
withdrawals (which typically precede financial statement disclosure) ^ we
find the change in systematic risk to be significant.4 We also document that
firms with continuing material uncertainties have significantly higher levels
of systematic risk than do firms announcing initial uncertainties. Our final series of tests include an analysis of changes in unsystematic risk. The results of
these tests illustrate that unsystematic risk changes significantly, and in the
prediction direction, when audit qualifications and withdrawals are announced. In summary, this paper provides evidence that qualified opinions
are associated with significant changes in firm risk.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section provides background information on the nature of the qualifications used in this
study. The third section provides our hypothesis development and the fourth
section presents the sample selection procedure and summary data. The final
two sections describe our results and provide concluding remarks.

BACKGROUND

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58 (AICPA, 1988a) effectively eliminated the
`subject-to' audit opinion which auditors used to highlight financial statement
uncertainties.5 The `subject-to' qualifications have been replaced by explanatory paragraphs which do not appear to be announced to the public (as distinct from included in the audit report). Going concern modifications can
still be made under SAS No. 59 (AICPA, 1988b); however, between 1993 and
1996 a search of the Wall Street Journal Index identified only six public announcements of such modifications. We therefore focus our study on the announcement of the earlier `subject-to' qualifications.
The use of `subject-to' opinions does facilitate comparison to previous research. Early qualification-based research focused on detecting price revisions
on the day the market learned of the qualifications. Results of this line of research are mixed. Ball, Walker and Whittred (1979), and Dodd, Dopuch,
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Holthausen and Leftwich (1984) fail to support a price reaction to a qualification issuance. Elliott (1982) finds a price reaction prior to the announcement
but not at the time of the announcement. Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich
(1986) find a negative average price reaction to announcements of audit qualifications. These conflicting results are due in part to different definitions of
information release dates and different treatment of potentially confounding
news events.
More recently, Fields and Wilkins (1991) find a positive average price reaction to announcements of qualification withdrawals. Choi and Jeter (1992)
show that qualified opinions are associated with decreasing earnings response
coefficients. Chen and Church (1996) find that firms receiving a going concern
opinion experience less negative returns around bankruptcy filings. Our paper
extends this line of research by testing whether audit reports provide information that is relevant to the assessment of firm risk. Because our focus (i.e., the
information content of the audit report) is comparable to that of previous researchers, this study is also subject to similar limitations. For example, because
qualifications tend to follow a series of unfavorable economic events (Elliott,
1982), we cannot unambiguously separate information regarding the underlying uncertainties from the information content of the qualification per se.
Further, to the extent that qualifications lag more timely announcements of
underlying uncertainties, our tests will be biased against identifying shifts in
risk.6 Our results must be interpreted with respect to these limitations.

DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS

`Subject-to' qualifications result from uncertainties regarding issues such as
litigation, asset realization, utility rate decisions, financing difficulties, and
going concern assumptions. To the extent that these underlying uncertainties
increase the variance of a firm's return relative to the market return, the firm's
systematic risk will increase. Should the uncertainties leading to the qualification affect only unsystematic risk, then no change in systematic risk would be
expected.
The link between material uncertainties and systematic risk (i.e., beta) can
also be made by considering the theoretical components of systematic risk.
Hamada (1972) partitions the systematic risk of equity into operating risk
and risk arising from financial leverage. Regarding qualified opinions, uncertainties regarding asset realization and litigation, for example, can be viewed
as affecting the operating risk of the firm. Another component of systematic
risk, a component that is relevant in the context of qualified audit opinions, is
default risk. Campbell and Mutchler (1988) suggest that the issuance of a
going concern opinion may increase the firm's probability of financial failure.
In other words, relatively severe opinions may increase the likelihood that
firms will default on their debt obligations. Consistent with this prediction,
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Chen and Church (1996) find that going concern opinions reduce the surprise
associated with bankruptcy. To the extent that default risk cannot be diversified away, changes in default risk surrounding qualification announcements
will also be positively related to changes in systematic risk.
Based on the expected changes in operating risk and/or default risk commensurate with the existence of `material uncertainties', systematic risk
should increase following qualification announcements. More formally, our
hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Equity betas increase subsequent to announcements of qualified opinions.
We operationalize our hypothesis with the market model, an empirical analog of the Capital Asset Pricing Model:
Rit 

i



i Rmt

 it

1

where Rit is the return for firm i on day t, and Rmt is the market return on day t.7
To test for shifts in risk around qualification announcements, we estimate the
following modified market model regression from day ÿ200 to day +200 relative to the first public announcement of the qualified opinion:
Rit 

1i



2i Di
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Rmt Di   it :
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To allow the coefficients to vary across firms, the model is estimated separately
for each sample firm and the average parameter estimates are used in our empirical tests. In equation (2), D is equal to zero for all trading days up to and
including the day of the qualification announcement and is equal to one for all
trading days after the qualification announcement. Under this specification,
2 tests for a shift in systematic risk and 2 controls for changes in the intercept.8 If a qualified opinion is positively associated with a firm's systematic
risk level, then 2 should be positive.

SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY MEASURES

Sample Selection Procedure
To obtain our sample of publicly announced qualified opinions, we searched
the Wall Street Journal Index from 1972 through 1992. We omitted announcements occurring on the same day as the firm's earnings announcement. The
remaining announcements do not include restructuring, dividend changes,
or other contaminating events, but they do discuss the reason for the qualification. To be included in the final sample, firms were required to be listed on the
CRSP NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ tapes, to be shown on Standard and
Poor's COMPUSTAT tapes, and to have non-missing audit opinion codes
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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(COMPUSTAT item #149). The latter restriction is necessary to determine
whether the firm's first publicly announced qualified opinion occurred in the
same year that it first received a qualification (to be discussed later).
Application of these criteria resulted in a sample of 110 qualification announcements. The `subject-to' opinion announcements in this study include
five categories: litigation, asset realization, financing issues, utility rate cases,
and going concern assumptions. Our sample of public announcements has a
lower proportion of asset realization uncertainties (18%) and a higher proportion of going concern qualifications (13%) than previous research (e.g. Elliott 1982; and Dodd et al., 1984). The proportion of litigation
announcements (38%) is similar to that found in prior studies. Analysis based
upon the type of qualification is not conducted due to the relatively small
number of observations in each category. To the extent that some types of qualifications are not viewed by investors as reflecting an uncertainty that impacts
firm risk, aggregation across all types of opinions may decrease the likelihood
that we detect significant changes in equity beta.9
Summary Measures
Figure 1 provides a summary of the changes in net income, leverage and market value of equity for firms announcing qualified opinions. As might be expected, median net income declines in the year prior to qualification and in
the year of qualification, but increases in post-qualification years. Median financial leverage levels increase during the qualification period then decrease
in the post-qualification period. This trend, however, appears to be due primarily to changes in equity value rather than changes in outstanding debt,
because debt-to-asset levels (not pictured) remain relatively constant across
the five-year period. Median equity betas based on fiscal year calculations do
not appear to exhibit the general trend predicted by Hypothesis 1. Specifically, based on a Wilcoxon test, median systematic risk calculated over the
two hundred days prior to the qualification announcement is not significantly
different from the median systematic risk following the qualification announcement. More powerful tests are presented in the following section.

RESULTS

Initial Tests
Table 1 presents the results of our initial tests. To conduct these tests, we first
estimated equation (2) for each firm and then examined the cross-sectional
distribution of firm coefficients. To reduce the impact of influential outliers
we excluded observations where the parameter estimate was more than four
standard deviations from the mean parameter estimate across all firms. This
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Figure 1
Changes in Median Values for Selected Summary Measures Surrounding
Public Announcements of Qualified Audit Opinions

ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Figure 1 (Continued)
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Table 1
Results of Tests for Changes in Systematic Risk for Firms Having Publicly
Announced Qualified Opinions
Panel A: Complete Sample
N
All firms:
Mean
Median
Positive:Negative

106

1

ÿ0.0016*
ÿ0.0001*
25:81

2

0.0016*
0.0014*
71:35

1

1.2549*
1.1909*
105:1

2

ÿ0.0436
ÿ0.0135
52:54

Panel B: Initial versus Recurring Qualifications
N

1

2

1

2

Firms announcing
initial qualifications:
Mean
71
Median
Positive: Negative

ÿ0.0017*
ÿ0.0009*
17:54

0.0019*
0.0014*
50:21

1.1385*
0.9983*
70:1

0.0084
0.0874
37:34

Firms announcing
recurring qualifications:
Mean
35
Median
Positive:Negative

ÿ0.0015*
ÿ0.0017*
8:27

0.0011*
0.0001*
21:14

1.4910*
1.4752*
35:0

ÿ0.1493
ÿ0.1871
15:20

Wilcoxon Test
for equality of
1 across subsamples
Wilcoxon Test
for equality of
2 across subsamples

Z = 2.64
(p=0.01)
Z = 1.21
(p=0.23)

Notes:
Coefficients are based on the following model, estimated from day ÿ200 through day +200:
Rit  1i  2i Di  1i Rmt  2i Rmt Di   it , where D is equal to 0 for days ÿ200 through 0, and
is equal to 1 for days +1 through +200. The model is estimated for each firm and the distribution of
coefficients (summarized in the table) provides the basis for the empirical tests.
* Denotes significance at p < 0:05 (two-tailed).

procedure eliminated four announcements, resulting in a final sample of 106
announcements. Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the sample is comprised of
relatively high risk firms, with a mean (pre-announcement) beta of 1.25 and
a median beta of 1.19. However, the coefficient on the change in systematic
risk ( 2 ) is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, less than half of
the firms (52/106) exhibit an increase in systematic risk around the qualification announcement. These results fail to support the hypothesis that there is an
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Figure 2
Changes in Mean and Median Beta Levels Calculated Across 100-Day Intervals to Public Announcements of Qualified Audit Opinions

average increase in systematic risk following announcements of qualified audit
opinions.10
One reason for the absence of a significant risk shift may be that qualification announcements in general tend to follow other forms of disclosure. For
example, most public announcements (i.e., media disclosures) of qualified
opinions occur after the information has already been presented in firms' annual reports. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that a shift in risk may occur
prior to the public announcement, particularly if the shift is attributable to the
underlying economic events giving rise to the qualification. This possibility is
examined in Figure 2. Figure 2 illustrates changes in mean and median betas
calculated over 100-day intervals around the qualification announcements.
Both mean and median systematic risk appear to increase most significantly
during the period prior to announcement (interval ÿ100,0) with little change
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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observed during the first post-announcement interval. Furthermore, during
the second post-announcement interval systematic risk appears to decrease
significantly. We conjecture that the decrease may be attributable to some
firms satisfactorily resolving the material uncertainties that gave rise to the
qualifications. In short, the data presented in Figure 2 suggest that qualifications may be associated with increases in risk, but that partitioning based on
the public announcement is not sufficient to identify such increases. Specifically, much of the positive risk shift appears to occur prior to the qualification
announcement.
Initial versus Recurring Qualifications
The results from the previous section suggest that an increase in risk may be
commensurate with the issuance of a qualified opinion, but that identifying
the point at which the shift occurs is difficult. To examine this relation further,
we partitioned the sample into firms announcing an initial qualification ^ that
is, firms with announcements of the first-reported qualification on COMPUSTAT ^ and firms announcing recurring qualifications. The information content of the qualification announcement should be higher for firms announcing
initial qualifications. As a result, we expect the shift in risk to be more positive
for this sample than for the sample of firms announcing recurring qualifications.
Panel B of Table 1 provides mean and median coefficient estimates for the two
subsamples. Although the median increase in risk is positive (0.08) for firms announcing initial qualifications and negative (ÿ0.18) for firms announcing recurring qualifications, neither estimate is statistically significant and the difference
between the two coefficients is insignificant as well. What is apparent from Panel
B, however, is that the pre-announcement level of systematic risk for firms announcing recurring qualifications is significantly higher than that of firms announcing initial qualifications. The mean (median) pre-announcement
coefficient for the former group of firms is 1.49 (1.47) as opposed to 1.13 (0.99)
for the latter group. Thus, firms that fail to resolve their material uncertainties
experience higher levels of systematic risk, a finding which is generally consistent
with the trend depicted in Figure 2. Specifically, qualified opinions are associated with changes in systematic risk, but it is difficult to determine the point
at which risk levels begin to increase.
Qualification Withdrawals
Fields and Wilkins (1991) document a significantly positive share price response for publicly announced qualification withdrawals, attributing the effect to the fact that such announcements typically precede other forms of
disclosure.11 In other words, most announcements stating that material uncertainties have been satisfactorily resolved are made prior to the audit report
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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included in firms' year-end filings.12 Because qualification withdrawal announcements tend to provide more timely information, they may provide the
cleanest test of the association between audit opinions and changes in systematic risk as well. To examine this possibility, we tested for shifts in systematic
risk around publicly announced qualification withdrawals. If qualifications
are positively associated with changes in systematic risk, then qualification
withdrawals should be followed by significant decreases in equity beta.
Figure 3 provides summary data for firms announcing qualification withdrawals. Our sample is comprised of the 52 firms utilized by Fields and Wilkins (1991), which were collected from both the Wall Street Journal Index and the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service from 1970 through 1989. After imposing the
screen for influential outliers, 50 withdrawal announcements remain in the
sample. Firms announcing qualification withdrawals experience steadily increasing long-term debt levels and steadily increasing equity values across
the five-year period. To the extent that increases in leverage increase systematic risk, the increase in leverage should reduce the ability of our tests to detect a
decrease in systematic risk following a qualification withdrawal. Median equity betas, however, appear to exhibit the trend that we expect. Specifically,
based on a Wilcoxon test, median systematic risk calculated over the two hundred days following the announcement (beta of 1.06) is significantly lower
than in the two hundred days prior to the qualification announcement (beta
of 1.29).
Table 2 presents formal tests for decreases in systematic risk around announcements of audit qualification withdrawals. The withdrawal firms are
less risky than firms in the qualification sample, but still have a higher pre-announcement systematic risk level (mean beta = 1.18) than the market average.
The mean coefficient for the shift in risk, 2 , is negative (ÿ0.14) and significant
at less than the five percent level, indicating that qualification withdrawal announcements are followed by significant decreases in systematic risk. Given
that no significant shift was found for announcements of qualified opinions,
these findings suggest that information timeliness is important in assessing
the changes in risk that are associated with qualified audit opinions.
To refine our analysis further, we partitioned the sample of withdrawal announcements into firms with publicly announced withdrawals before annual
report disclosure and firms with announcements that are made after annual
report disclosure. Announcements that occur prior to the release of the annual
report should have greater information content and hence should provide a
stronger test of our hypothesis. Panel B of Table 2 shows that for the subsample
of firms with publicly announced withdrawals prior to annual report disclosure, the mean coefficient on the decline in risk is negative (ÿ0.28, median =
ÿ0.30) and significant. Furthermore, 63% of the firms represented in this subsample exhibit a decline in systematic risk following the withdrawal announcement. In contrast, no significant decrease in equity beta is found for
firms announcing the withdrawal after its original annual report disclosure.
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Figure 3
Changes in Median Values for Selected Summary Measures Surrounding
Public Announcements of Withdrawn Qualified Audit Opinions

ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Table 2
Results of Tests for Changes in Systematic Risk for Firms Having Publicly
Announced Qualification Withdrawals
Panel A: Complete Sample
N
All firms:
Mean
Median
Positive:Negative

50

1

0.0002
0.0002
28:22

2

ÿ0.0006
ÿ0.0001
23:27

1

1.1806*
1.2939*
49:1

2

ÿ0.1431*
ÿ0.1651
23:27

Panel B: Timely versus Untimely Announcements
N

1

2

1

2

Firms with publicly
announced withdrawal
prior to disclosure
in annual report:
Mean
27
Median
Positive:Negative

0.0003
0.0003
16:11

ÿ0.0009
ÿ0.0001
13:14

1.3844*
1.3930*
27:0

ÿ0.2851*
ÿ0.3000*
10:17

Firms with publicly
announced withdrawal
after disclosure in
annual report
Mean
23
Median
Positive:Negative

0.0001
0.0002
12:11

ÿ0.0002
ÿ0.0002
10:13

0.9414*
1.0325*
22:1

0.0236
0.1729
13:10

Wilcoxon Test for
equality of 1 across
subsamples
Wilcoxon Test for
equality of 2 across
subsamples

Z=2.34
(p  0:02)
Z=2.71
(p  0:01)

Notes:
Coefficients are based on the following model, estimated from day ÿ200 through day +200:
Rit  1i  2i Di  1i Rmt  2i Rmt Di   it , where D is equal to 0 for days ÿ200 through 0, and
is equal to 1 for days +1 through +200. The model is estimated for each firm and the distribution of
coefficients (summarized in the table) provides the basis for the empirical tests.
* Denotes significance at p < 0:05 (two-tailed).

These findings suggest, as expected, that announcements that have not been
pre-empted by other forms of disclosure have the greatest information effect.13
Additional tests reported in Panel B show that the pre-announcement beta ( 1 ) is
significantly lower for firms announcing withdrawals after annual report discloß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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sure than for firms publicly announcing withdrawals prior to annual report disclosure. In other words, because information regarding the withdrawal has already been disseminated (via the audit report) for the first group of firms, the
risk level of these firms appears to have already adjusted downward by the time
of the public announcement. This result is comparable to our findings regarding
qualification announcements in that the ability to detect changes in systematic
risk is heavily influenced by the timeliness of the disclosure.14
Unsystematic Risk
In addition to affecting systematic risk, the material uncertainties highlighted
in audit reports can be expected to influence the unsystematic, diversifiable
risk of the firm.15 While systematic risk is of primary interest to investors, other
parties may be concerned with changes in unsystematic (i.e., firm-specific)
risk. Such information should be valued, for example, by lenders, rating agencies, suppliers, regulators, unions, and employees as they evaluate a firm's
ability to satisfy its existing business contracts.16 To test for changes in unsystematic risk we calculated the variance of the residuals from market models
estimated during the period prior to announcement and during the period
after announcement. As in Healy and Palepu (1990), firm-specific F-statistics
were then calculated as the ratio of the two residual variances. The significance of the sample distribution of these F-statistics forms the basis for the unsystematic risk analysis. The test statistic is calculated as follows:
ÿ2

N
X

ln pj

3

j1

where pj is the probability value associated with the F-statistic for firm j and N
is the number of firms in the sample. Under the null hypothesis that the sample
distribution of F-statistics is no different from that expected by chance, the
statistic represented by equation (3) is distributed chi-square with 2N degrees
of freedom.17 Hypothesis two, stated in alternative form, is provided below:
H2: Residual variance increases (decreases) subsequent to announcements
of qualified opinions (qualification withdrawals)
Table 3 presents results for the unsystematic risk tests. The results provide
strong evidence of an increase in unsystematic risk around qualification announcements and a decrease in unsystematic risk around withdrawal announcements. For the qualification sample, the residual variance increases
from a mean of 0.14% in the pre-qualification period to a mean of 0.24% in
the post-qualification period. The difference is significant at the five percent
level (chi- square statistic = 364.33), and is found to be largest for firms announcing initial qualifications. Comparable findings hold for firms announß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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Table 3
Results of Tests for Changes in Unsystematic Risk for Firms Announcing
Qualifications and Qualification Withdrawals
Panel A: Firms Announcing Qualified Opinions

Firms Included

N

All Firms
106
Firms announcing initial
qualifications
71
Firms announcing recurring
qualifications
35

Before
Announcement

After
Announcement

2 Statistic
for Increase
2

0.14%

0.24%

364.33*

0.13%

0.26%

236.18*

0.14%

0.22%

128.26*

2

2

Panel B: Firms Announcing Qualification Withdrawals
2 After
Announcement

2 Statistic
for Decrease
2

Firms Included

N

2 Before
Announcement

All Firms
Firms announcing withdrawals before disclosure
in annual report
Firms announcing withdrawals after disclosure
in annual report

50

0.11%

0.10%

135.54*

27

0.14%

0.11%

88.51*

23

0.08%

0.09%

47.03

Notes:
Tests are based on residual variances from market models estimated for each firm in both pre- and
post-announcement periods. The ratio of the residual variances provides an F-statistic for each
firm. Aggregate test statistics (2 ) are based on the resulting probability values (see text for details).
* Denotes significance at p < 0:05.

cing qualification withdrawals. For these firms, the residual variance decreases from a mean of 0.11% in the pre-withdrawal period to a mean of
0.10% in the post-withdrawal period. As with the qualification sample, the
difference is significant at the five percent level (chi-square statistic = 135.54)
and is most pronounced for firms with more timely information disclosures. In
sum, both qualification and qualification withdrawal announcements are associated with significant changes in the unsystematic risk of affected firms.

CONCLUSIONS

Market-based studies involving `subject-to' opinions have yielded mixed results
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
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regarding the information content of qualification announcements. This study focuses on the changes in risk around announcements of qualifications and around
the more timely announcements of qualification withdrawals. Although our tests
do not isolate the shift in risk around qualification announcements, we do show
that firms announcing recurring material uncertainties have higher levels of systematic risk than firms announcing initial qualifications. Furthermore, we document a significant decrease in systematic risk for firms publicly announcing
qualification withdrawals. These results are consistent with announcements of
qualification withdrawals providing greater (i.e., more timely) information to capital market participants than announcements of qualified opinions, which are
more likely to have been pre-empted by alternative sources of information.
Our findings also indicate that unsystematic, or firm-specific, risk changes
significantly around qualification and withdrawal announcement dates.
Combined with our results regarding systematic risk, the data indicate that
qualifications provide investors and other external users with information that
is relevant to the evaluation of firm risk. In selecting a sample of announcements where the qualification was made prior to SAS No. 58, we gained comparability with previous studies and retained the objective identification of
qualification announcements. Similar to previous studies, however, we cannot
unambiguously separate the information regarding the material uncertainties
giving rise to the qualification from the information conveyed by the qualification itself.
Future research is needed to more effectively address the extent to which
auditors evaluate information that is not available to other financial statement users. Furthermore, additional work is needed to determine how this information can be communicated most effectively to investors, creditors and
other interested parties.

NOTES
1
2
3

4
5
6

The term, `red flag', is used in financial analysis to indicate that the analyst should examine
certain items more closely. The list of red flags noted by Palepu, Bernard and Healy (1996)
includes qualified audit opinions.
This is not to say that audit qualifications cause changes in risk; rather, qualifications likely
highlight economic conditions that give rise to changes in risk.
Choi and Jeter (1992, Table 3 p. 240) detect no change in systematic risk between pre-qualification and post-qualification periods for a sample of `subject-to' qualifications. The purpose of
their study, however, was to investigate changes in earnings response coefficients rather than
changes in risk. Our study is specifically designed to examine whether the announcement of a
qualified audit opinion is a sufficient event for identifying a shift in risk.
For qualification withdrawals, we document a significant decrease in risk. The change in risk
following qualification withdrawals is expected to be negative because the previously outstanding material uncertainties have been resolved.
See Elliott (1982) for detailed discussion of the types of qualifications issued and references to
the appropriate professional standards.
If qualification announcements follow other forms of disclosure, trading days that should be
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7
8

9
10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17

FARGHER AND WILKINS

included in the post-announcement period may be included in the pre-announcement period.
If the effect of the qualification is to increase risk, this misclassification will overstate pre-announcement risk levels, making the detection of a shift in risk less likely.
In our empirical tests, Rmt is defined as the return on the equally-weighted market index.
Controlling for a shift in the intercept is important for two reasons. First, to the extent that the
intercept varies with the risk-free rate of interest, the intercept is not expected to remain constant over time. Second, because the slope coefficient is mechanically related to the intercept in
a one factor model, holding the intercept constant can lead to spurious measurement of a
change in the slope.
As a sensitivity test, we partition based on going concern versus non-going concern opinions.
Because our results are not changed by this partition, however, discussions of the empirical
tests include all types of `subject-to' opinions.
In the interest of completeness, we also tested for stock price reactions to qualification announcements. Similar to Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), we find significantly negative abnormal returns when qualified opinions are announced.
Similar conclusions are reached by Dodd et al. (1984) and Dopuch et al. (1986) in their studies
of qualified opinions.
Fields and Wilkins (1991) show that most publicly announced withdrawals are made within
one year of the initial qualification, and that over half of the publicly announced withdrawals
precede annual report disclosures.
We also replicated the share price tests of Fields and Wilkins (1991). Similar to Fields and
Wilkins (1991), we find that withdrawal announcements are associated with a positive average
share price response, and that the average price effect is attributable primarily to the subsample of firms with more timely announcements
Our tests for both qualifications and qualification withdrawals reveal that the observed shifts
in systematic risk stem from changes in returns variance as opposed to changes in the correlation with market returns. That is, qualified opinions are followed by a significant (p < 0:001)
increase in returns variance while qualification withdrawals are followed by a significant
(p < 0:001) decrease in returns variance.
Beaver et al. (1979) and Miller and Scholes (1972), among others, note that systematic and
unsystematic risk may be jointly determined. That is, the two elements of total risk are not
completely independent.
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) also use unsystematic risk as a predictor of bond ratings.
Values of pj less than 0.05 are set equal to 0.05 before taking the log in order to reduce the impact of small values and produce a more conservative test statistic.
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